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In Hong Kong, kindergartens and primary schools were 
closed when local transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
was identiﬁ  ed. Secondary schools closed for summer vaca-
tion shortly afterwards. By ﬁ  tting a model of reporting and 
transmission to case data, we estimated that transmission 
was reduced ≈25% when secondary schools closed. 
T
he emergence and subsequent global spread of pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 presents several challenges to 
health policy makers. Although some countries have sub-
stantial antiviral drug stockpiles available for treatment and 
chemoprophylaxis and vaccines became available toward 
the end of 2009, nonpharmaceutical interventions remain 
the primary resource available to most populations to miti-
gate the impact of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (1). One such 
nonpharmaceutical intervention is school closure, either 
reactively following outbreaks or proactively at district 
or regional levels (2,3). A recent review has highlighted 
the lack of consensus over the potential beneﬁ  ts of school 
closures and the potential economic and social costs (4). 
Although the current pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus is of 
moderate severity, data from 2009 provide an ideal oppor-
tunity to estimate the effectiveness of interventions against 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza.
In Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, there was a considerable delay 
between the ﬁ  rst reported imported case on May 1, 2009, 
and the ﬁ  rst reported local case (i.e., not otherwise epide-
miologically linked with outside travel, contact with an im-
ported case-patient, or contact with an infected person who 
had contact with an imported case-patient) was laboratory-
conﬁ  rmed and reported to the government on June 10. Dur-
ing the initial stages of the epidemic, the local government 
operated under containment phase protocols, in which all 
conﬁ  rmed cases were isolated in hospital and their contacts 
were traced, quarantined in hotels, hospitals, and holiday 
camps, and provided with antiviral drug prophylaxis. When 
the ﬁ  rst nonimported case was conﬁ  rmed, the government 
entered the mitigation phase and announced immediate clo-
sure of all primary schools, kindergartens, childcare cen-
ters and special schools, initially for 14 days. Closures were 
subsequently continued until the summer vacation began 
July 10. Secondary schools generally remained open, while 
those with >1 conﬁ  rmed case were immediately closed for 
14 days. Some containment-phase policies, including isola-
tion of cases and prophylaxis of contacts, were maintained 
until June 27. During our study period, patients seeking 
treatment for suspected inﬂ  uenza at designated fever clin-
ics and public hospital emergency departments were rou-
tinely tested, and pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection 
was a reportable infectious disease.
The Study
We analyzed epidemiologic data on laboratory-con-
ﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infections collected by the 
Hong Kong Hospital Authority and Centre for Health Pro-
tection (the e-ﬂ  u database). The epidemic curve of labo-
ratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases showed a 
biphasic pattern, with a small initial peak in reported cases 
at the end of June followed by a nadir at the beginning of 
July and rising incidence after that (Figure, panel A).
We speciﬁ   ed an age-structured susceptible-infec-
tious-recovered transmission model to explain the early 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 dynamics in Hong Kong (online 
Technical Appendix, www.cdc.gov/EID/content/16/3/538-
Techapp.pdf). We estimated change points in the propor-
tion of symptomatic infections identiﬁ  ed and age-speciﬁ  c 
rates of seeding of infectious cases from overseas. A simple 
3-period model for changes in reporting rates provided a 
parsimonious ﬁ  t to the data (Figure, panel B). Reporting 
rates were deﬁ  ned relative to the initial reporting rate. The 
comparison between the observed and estimated incidence 
is shown in the Figure, panel C.
We estimated that the relative rate of reporting declined 
to ≈5.2% of its initial value from June 29 onward (Table). 
Persons <19 years of age were estimated to be 2.6× more 
susceptible than the rest of the population. The estimated ef-
fective reproductive number was 1.7 before educational in-
stitutions for children <13 years of age were closed on June 
11, 1.5 between June 11 and July 10 when summer vacation 
began, and 1.1 for the rest of the summer. The drop in repro-
ductive number was driven by an estimated 70% reduction 
in intra–age-group transmission concurrent with school clo-
sures. The ﬁ  tted model implies that ≈182,000 persons (2.5% 
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of the population) had experienced illness associated with 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection by August 27.
Figure, panel D shows that in the period from the ﬁ  rst 
conﬁ  rmed local case to the start of summer vacation on July 
10, there were a substantial number of cases among older 
children (whose schools remained open) but few among 
younger children (whose schools were closed during this 
period). Only 10% of Hong Kong residents are young chil-
dren <12 years of age, 8% are older children 13–18 years 
of age, and 82% are adults.
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Figure. Epidemiologic characteristics of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, People’s Republic of 
China, during May through August 2009. A) Time series of laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases classiﬁ  ed as imported or 
nonimported (by age group) by date of illness onset. B) Estimates of the proportion of cases with illness onset on each day that would 
subsequently be identiﬁ  ed and laboratory conﬁ  rmed (reporting rates). C) Time series of nonimported pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases 
by date of illness onset and the estimates of the underlying true epidemic curve (dashed line) and the ﬁ  tted observed epidemic curve 
allowing for changes in reporting rates (solid line). Dots indicate cases reported on a given day. Number of cases plotted logarithmically. D) 
Distribution of ages of laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases over time plotted as 3-day rolling averages. Error bars indicate 
95% conﬁ  dence intervals.Conclusions
In Hong Kong, kindergartens and primary schools were 
closed when local transmission of pandemic inﬂ  uenza was 
identiﬁ  ed. By using a parsimonious transmission model to 
interpret age-speciﬁ  c reporting data, we concluded that the 
subsequent closure of secondary schools for the summer 
vacation was associated with substantially lower trans-
mission across age groups. We estimated that reporting of 
cases declined to 5.2% of its initial rate through the second 
half of June; this is plausible given the gradual change from 
containment phase to mitigation phase over that period.
It is challenging to infer the precise impact of school 
closures in Hong Kong, given that they were implemented 
immediately and sustained until summer vacation and so 
we have little data on local transmissibility in the absence 
of school closures. In previous pandemics attack rates have 
generally been highest in younger children (4,5), and this 
has been noted for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Mexico (6) 
and Chicago (7). This observation, in combination with our 
ﬁ  nding that children <12 years of age were relatively un-
affected in Hong Kong during the school closure period 
(Figure, panel D), intuitively implies that closures were ef-
fective in preventing infections in this age group. Further-
more, assuming that children are responsible for up to half 
of all community transmission (8), it is likely that protec-
tion of younger children had substantial indirect beneﬁ  ts. 
Previous studies have suggested that sustained school clo-
sures during a pandemic could reduce peak attack rates and 
prevent 13%–17% of total cases in France (8) or <20% of 
total cases in the United Kingdom (3). Our ﬁ  nding that the 
reproductive number declined from 1.5 during the kinder-
garten and primary school closures to 1.1 during summer 
vacation suggests that a much more substantial drop in at-
tack rates would result from sustained school closures.
By including a model of reporting, we have also been 
able to estimate case numbers. We estimated a cumulative 
illness attack rate of ≈182,000 cases (2.5% of the popu-
lation) by August 27. Between June 29 and August 27, a 
total of 1,522/9,846 conﬁ   rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
case-patients were hospitalized for medical reasons, among 
whom 13 died. These numbers are more consistent with a 
substantially lower case-fatality ratio than suggested by ini-
tial estimates of the severity of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
strain (9,10). These estimates are dependent on the initial 
rate of reporting being close to 100%.
We assumed that transmission varied by age and time. 
If reporting rates varied in a way not accounted for by our 
model, this would affect the accuracy of our estimates of 
growth rate and cumulative attack rates. Although we at-
tributed changes in transmissibility between June and Au-
gust to school closures and summer vacations, it is possible 
that other secular changes or external factors such as sea-
sonality also contributed. However, it is unlikely that sea-
sonal factors would have reduced transmission of inﬂ  uenza 
at this time of year, on the basis of symptomatic and labora-
tory conﬁ  rmed incidence of inﬂ  uenza from previous years 
(11). Reference data on age-speciﬁ  c population attack rates 
from serologic surveys or population-based surveillance 
systems would enable us to calibrate our estimates of re-
porting rates and growth rates and provide external valida-
tion of our model estimates. 
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Table. Summary statistics of posterior distributions obtained by using Markov Chain Monte Carlo in modeling the effects of school
closures on mitigating a pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak, Hong Kong, 2009* 
Parameter† Posterior mean (SD)  95% CI 
<13 y: 0.1 (0.1)  0–0.04
13–19 y: 0.4 (0.1)  0.2–0.6
Mi, daily number of effective seeds in age class i, I = 1,2,3 
>19 y: 0.2 (0.2)  0–0.6
Basic reproductive number  Before Jun 11: 1.71 (0.04)  1.63–1.78
Relative susceptibility of persons <20 y of age   2.64 (0.08)  2.48–2.78
Percentage reduction in intra-age-group transmission given by school closures  70% (3%)  64%–75% 
t1, the date at which reporting rates began to decline  Jun 18 (1.2 d)  Jun 17–Jun 21 
t2, the date at which reporting rates stopped declining  Jun 29 (0.3 d)  Jun 29–Jun 30 
r2, the reporting rate after t2 5.2% (1.1%) 3.5%–7.7% 
*CI, confidence interval. 
†Model assumes a linear decline in reporting rates from 100% to r2 between times t1 and t2.School Closure and Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Hong Kong
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